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Two

APPROACHES TO THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE:

LOOK AT THE HARPER &

Row,

A

PUBLISHERS, INC. V.

NATION ENTERPRISES, DECISIONS
On February 28, 1977, former President Gerald Ford granted
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. (Harper & Row) and Reader's Digest Association, Inc. (Reader's Digest) exclusive rights to publish
in book form his yet unwritten memoirs.' The book was to include
information on the pardon of Richard M. Nixon, Ford's childhood,
his political career, and his perception of several political figures.
In March of 1979, Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation, came into
possession of a copy of the unpublished memoirs.2 Upon receipt of
the draft, Mr. Navasky diligently and expediently read the entire
manuscript before returning it to its source and selected material
for a news article. Mr. Navasky's article entitled, "The Ford
Memoirs, Behind the Pardon," appeared in the April 7, 1979 issue
of The Nation. The article divulged pertinent topics of the Ford
memoirs, focusing on the decision to pardon Richard Nixon. 3
Harper & Row claimed that the publication of Mr. Navasky's
article by Nation Enterprises' and the Nation Associates, Inc. constituted copyright infringement 5 under the Copyright Act of 1976
(the Act).6 The Nation asserted that Harper & Row's pendent
1. According to an agreement between Time magazine and Harper & Row, Time was
to pay Harper & Row $25,000 for the serial rights to the memoirs, $12,500 on signing and
$12,500 when Time published selected excerpts. As a result of The Nation's article, Time
never published any excerpts, nor did it pay the second $12,500.
2. The Nation is a magazine devoted in large part to political commentary and news.
Mr. Navasky testified that he neither solicited nor paid for the delivery of the manuscript
and that upon its receipt, he had not been aware of Time's pre-publication rights.
3. The article's introduction announced the expected publication dates of Ford's book,
A TIME To HzAL. The introduction was followed by nineteen paragraphs regarding the decision to pardon Nixon. In total, the article was approximately 2,500 words in length. The
manuscript, in comparison was nearly 200,000 words covering 665 typed pages.
4. Nation Enterprises is the publisher of The Nation.
5. Harper & Row also alleged conversion and tortious interference with their contract.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1976). Section 106 provides exclusive rights to the owner of
a copyright under this title to do and authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, or choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
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state law claims of conversion and tortious interference with contract were preempted by the Act and moved to have these counts
dismissed. The District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted The Nation's motion to dismiss Harper & Row's
state claims because they asserted violations of rights equivalent to
rights already protected under the Act.' The district court dismissed the state claims because they failed to fulfill the requirements of the two-pronged test established by the Act. The twopronged test requires that first, the nature of the work of authorship in which rights are claimed must come within the subject
matter of copyright as defined in sections 102 and 103 of the Act.'
Second, that the rights granted by state law must not be
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright, as specified by section 106 of the Act.'
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, or choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
7. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
8. Section 102 provides:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
9. Section 106 provides:
Subject to Sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies of phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
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On the merits, the district court in 198310 held that The Nation failed to justify its use of the material under the fair use doctrine as now codified in section 107 of the Act." The district court
based its decision on the grounds that the revelations of the Ford
memoirs were not hot news as to permit the use of the author
Ford's copyrighted material. The district court upheld Harper &
Row's argument that although historical facts and memoranda are
not per se copyrightable, the historical facts together with Ford's
personal insight made the work as a whole copyrightable. 2
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held, affirmed in part and reversed in part. Harper & Row
had failed to fulfill the two-prong test needed to sustain their state
claims of conversion and tortious interference with contract. The
Second Circuit, however, reversed the lower court's finding of copyright infringement. Despite the fact that the author's chosen language was taken by virtue of short segments of verbatim quotation,
such use was considered permissible under the doctrine of fair use.
The paraphrasingof disparate facts, if held to be an infringement
of copyright, would clash with the legislative history which establishes that such information is not to be protected.13 Finally, much
of the material used in The Nation's article was held to be unworks, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1977).
10. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 557 F. Supp. 1067 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
11. Section 107 provides that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of a copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
12. Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. at 1072.
The court reasoned that the facts and memoranda were of interest to The Nation only
to the extent that The Nation could set forth Ford's views about them. Further, the court
believed that The Nation had no interest in presenting these historical facts and memoranda in isolation. Id.
13. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 56 (1976).
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copyrightable because a great deal of information concerning the
pardon decision was presented by President Ford to a Congressional subcommittee and subsequently printed in a government
document; it was therefore uncopyrightable. 14 Harper& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983).
The extremes of the two Harper & Row decisions regarding
the scope of what material is copyrightable in a non-fiction work
and what constitutes fair use in news reporting reflects the conflicting approaches to the fair use doctrine among the circuit courts
throughout the United States. With Harper& Row pending before
the Supreme Court, the time has come to lay to rest the discrepancies surrounding the above issues.
Fair use is a judicially created doctrine which has been codified in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act. 16 The doctrine permits some reasonable use of another's work under circumstances
that make it excusable and proper. Some reasonable uses designated in section 107 of the Act include criticism, comments, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. The policy behind
the doctrine is to serve the fundamental constitutional purpose of
encouraging contributions to recorded knowledge by granting subsequent authors of non-fiction works a relatively free hand to build
upon the work of their predecessors.
I. MATERIAL PROTECTABLE UNDER THE COPYRIGHT LAWS IN A
WORK OF NON-FICTION.
Section 102(b) of the Act provides that "[iun no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."" From
this section, and from the House Reports, it appears that Congress
recognizes the distinction between facts and ideas, which are not
1
copyrightable, and expressions which are. 7
In presenting their argument Harper & Row rejected The Nation's concept that expression must be limited "to its barest ele14. Pardonof Richard M. Nixon, and Related Matters: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Seass.
at 90-151 (1974). See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1982).
15. The doctrine first appeared'in Folsum v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1977). See supra note 8.
17. See S. Rep. No. 983, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 107-108 (1974), H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th
Cong. 2d Seas. 55-57 (1976).
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TWO APPROACHES TO THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE

ment-the ordering and choice of the words themselves." 18 Underlying Harper & Row's argument is the fact that the Second Circuit,
in supporting The Nation's argument, excluded from its consideration important elements of an author's expression-the author's
selection and arrangement of material, his analysis and interpretation of events, his structuring of material and marshalling of facts,
and his emphasis on particular developments.
Harper & Row found support for its argument in traditional
copyright holdings. A leading case is Wainwright Securities, Inc. v.
Wall Street Transcript Corp.,19 where the defendant published abstracts of plaintiff's financial research reports. The defendant in
Wainwright, like The Nation, relied upon news reporting as its
principle fair use defense. In upholding a finding of copyright infringement and denying the fair use defense, the court, in a unanimous decision, distinguished between news events which may not
be copyrighted and the form of expression which constitutes a fair
use:
What is protected is the manner of expression, the author's
analysis or interpretation of events, the way he structures his
material and marshalls facts, his choice of words, and the emphasis he gives to particular developments. Thus, the essence of
infringement lies not in taking a general theme or in coverage of
the reports as events, but in appropriating the 'particular expression through similarities of treatment details, scenes, events
and characterization.'"
This definition of expression has been followed in other circuits. As early as 1921, the Seventh Circuit in Chicago RecordHerald Co. v.Tribune Ass'n," held that where "the arrangement
and manner of statement plainly discloses a distinct literary flavor
and individuality of expression peculiar to authorship" the article
is clearly brought within the protection of the "Copyright Law.2
The Seventh Circuit reiterated this holding in Eisenschiml v.
Fawcett Publications, Inc.,2s where the court defined copyrighted
expression in a historical work to include "[tihe association, arrangement and combination of ideas and thought and their form of
expression. ...
18.

Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 204.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1014 (1978).
Id. at 96.
275 F. 797 (7th Cir. 1921).
Id. at 799.
246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1957).
Id. at 603.

Published by Institutional Repository, 1984

5

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 6

94

ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:89

The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have also held that the selection
and arrangements of facts are, as part of the author's expression,
protected by copyright. In Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 5
involving alleged copying from a work of non-fiction concerning a
highly publicized kidnapping, the Fifth Circuit upheld instructions
to the jury that "the form of expression of the facts and their arrangement and selection are copyrightable." 6 In United States v.
Hamilton,'7

the

Ninth

Circuit

accorded

protection

to the

mapmaker's "selection, arrangement, and presentation of terrain
8
features."2

Harper & Row asserted that the facts used, although per se
uncopyrightable, coupled with the author's expression are deserving of protection under the Act. The unauthorized copying of
works consisting primarily of factual material has been held to be
an infringement by a number of circuits. In Flick-Reedy Corp. v.
Hydro-Line Mfg.," the Seventh Circuit extended copyright protection to "the arrangement, expression and manner of presentation"
of mathematical data and formulae concerning hydraulic cylinders.30 The same court in Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co.,
held that the selection, ordering and arrangement of the names
and addresses of suppliers of gardening materials was also protected under copyright law."' In Hamilton,3 2 the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the map which it had copied
was not entitled to copyright because it was merely a synthesis of
information already depicted on maps in the public domain, finding instead that "[w]hen a work displays a significant element of
compilation, that element is protectable even though the individual components of the work may not be, for originality may be
found in taking the common place and making it into a new combination or arrangement."33
A recent Fifth Circuit case rejected the Second Circuit's dissection of a work into components for determining copyrightability. In Apple Barrel Productions, Inc. v. Beard," the court
stated, "[t]he mere fact that component parts of collector's work
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1368.
583 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 450.
351 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
Id. at 548.
556 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977).
583 F.2d 448.
Id. at 451.
730 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1984).
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are neither original to the plaintiff nor copyrightable by the plaintiff does not preclude a determination that the combination of
such component parts as a separate entity is both original and
'35
copyrightable.
The Nation's argument on the copyrightability of non-fiction
works is equally supported. First, The Nation's approach to the
fair use doctrine as embraced by the Second Circuit is distinctively
different from Harper & Row's approach. The Nation used what
may be termed as a dissection approach. It commenced by breaking down the work to: (1) what was appropriated by the defendant
from the plaintiff; (2) if anything was appropriated, whether such
appropriation was of copyrightable matter; and, if so, (3) whether
it was a substantial and material appropriation.3 In determining
whether the material appropriated was copyrightable the Second
Circuit looked to section 102(b) of the Act which grants rights not
in ideas or facts, but in expression. The court noted that the distinction between fact and expression is not always easy to draw.
The court did seize upon a narrow definition of copyrightable
material.
Several Supreme Court decisions support The Nation's position. In Mazer v. Stein,3 7 the Court held that "unlike a patent, a
copyright gives no exclusive right to the act disclosed; protection is
only given to the expression of the idea-not the idea itself."3 8 In
InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press,39 the Court stated
that the "element in intellectual productions which secures such
protection is not the knowledge, truths, ideas or emotions which
the composition expresses, but the form or sequence in which they
are expressed."' 0 In employing The Nation's definition of expression, the Second Circuit held that "in this case, there can be no
concern that this mode of expression was usurped; The Nation article drew only upon scattered parts and not the total entity with
its unique and protected mosaic."' 1
35. Id. at 388.
36. See H. Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property (1944). Courts have
analyzed works in this fashion for decades. See American Code Co., Inc. v. Bensinger, 282 F.
829 (2d Cir. 1922), which held, "It is necessary, however, to keep in mind the distinction
between copyrightability and the effect, and extent of the copyright when obtained. The
degree of protection afforded by the copyright is measured by what is actually copyrightable
in it, that is by the degree and nature of the original work." American Code, 282 F. at 834.
37. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
38. Id. at 217.
39. 284 U.S. 215 (1918).
40. Id. at 254.
41. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 203 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Furthermore, the majority stated that "[c]ourts have accordingly held that neither news events, historical facts, nor facts of a
biographical nature is deserving of protection under the Act. '42
43
The court cited Time Incorporated v. Bernard Geis Associates,
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,44 and Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,'4 5 respectively. The policy behind each of these cases is the same. To allow anyone to copyright
facts, information, or news would contravene the very purpose of
the copyright clause of the United States Constitution, viz., "to
'4
promote the progress of science and the useful arts." "
Regarding Harper & Row's "totality" concept, The Nation rejected this concept as "tantamount to permitting a public official
to take private possession of the most important details of a nation's historical and political life by adding language here and
there on the perceptions and sentiments he experienced while in
office and insisting the work's entire contents are thereby made his
alone by virtue of copyright. 47 To so hold would conclude that, in
copyrighting his book, Mr. Ford, and through him Harper & Row,
gained a monopoly on the facts of the Nixon pardon-precisely
what the fact/expression distinction seeks to avoid.48
The Nation argued that a great deal of the information concerning the pardon decision was presented by President Ford
before the Hungate Committee and subsequently printed in a government document and is therefore uncopyrightable. 4" The Nation
pointed to section 105 of the Act, which provides that "work[s] of
the United States Government" are not copyrightable. 50 The argument that factual material published and incorporated at large
may not be privately appropriated and taken from the public
under the guise of copyright is not new. It has been the law for
more than sixty years since announced in American Code Co. v.
2
Bensinger,5 1 and as recently as Hoehling.
42. Id. at 202.
43. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
44 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
45. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
46. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 202; See also U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8,cl.8.
47. 723 F.2d at 202.
48. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (1980); Berlin v. E.C.
Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cit. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
49. See supra note 14.
50. The court of appeals rejected The Nation's argument that oral conversations of
President Ford about official business held while in office were works of the United States
Government.
51. 282 F. 829 (2d Cir. 1922).
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II.

TWO APPROACHES TO THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE IN NEWS REPORTING

Harper & Row did not contest the idea that the fair use doctrine is a valuable means of balancing society's need for the dissemination of knowledge against an author's exclusive right in his
work. They disagreed with the importance that The Nation and
subsequently the Second Circuit placed on the citizenry's need to
be informed.
The fair use doctrine, as codified in section 107 of the Act,
includes four factors to be considered in determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use. These factors are: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy53
righted work.

In considering the purpose and the character of the use, the
first factor, Harper & Row criticized the soundness of The Nation's claim of news reporting. They argued that there was nothing
The Nation did to facilitate the harvesting of knowledge. The material was to be published as excerpts in Time magazine in about
two weeks and in full book form two weeks later. The knowledge
was going to be disseminated by reason of authorized publications
planned by the author and his publishers. Harper & Row criticized
the Second Circuit for not acknowledging this and for not making
any attempt to demonstrate the benefit derived from publishing
the material in The Nation two weeks prior to publishing in Time,
and four weeks prior to its release in book form.
Harper & Row attacked the claim by The Nation of fair use
by news reporting because of The Nation's failure to add any original commentary, interpretation or thought to its article." Beyond
The Nation reporting the upcoming publication of the Ford
memoirs, the article appears to be nothing more than a mere paraphrasing of the Ford manuscript. Harper & Row asserted that this
mere paraphrasing, together with the lack of public benefit,
demonstrated The Nation's lack of a legitimate purpose in pub52.. 618 F.2d 972; See also Greenbie v. Nobel, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Rosemont Enter. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
54. See Wainwright Sec., 558 F.2d at 96 where the court held "unlike traditional news
coverage . . . the transcript did not provide independent analysis or research; it did not

solicit comments on the same topics from other financial analysists; and it did not include
any critism, praise, or other reactions by industry officials or investigators. . . . This was
not a legitimate coverage of a news event ... "
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lishing the work as a news report.
The district court reasoned that because the subject matter of
the article had been subject to widespread publicity for five years,
"the revelations of the Ford memoirs were not such news, 'hot' or
otherwise, as to permit the use of author Ford's copyrighted
material." 8
The second and third factors, the nature of the copyrighted
work and the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, tie into Harper & Row's
totality argument. Harper & Row asserted that the value of the
memoirs was not in the facts involved; it was Ford's interpretation
and revelation upon those facts coupled with the manner and style
in which the former President put forth his revelations (his
method of treatment, emphasis and selection of details) that made
the work original and of value. Harper & Row maintained that,
had the Second Circuit applied this standard, the court would have
had a case which involved an extensive taking of expression. 6
Applying the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market value of the copyrighted work, Harper & Row argued first, that as a result of The Nation article, Time refused to
publish the excerpts. Resultingly, Harper & Row never received
the $12,500.00 payable upon the publication of the excerpts.
Harper & Row also argued that the precedent set by this case
will adversely affect the incentives to authorship and the dissemination of information. Under the majority holding, Harper & Row
maintained that one may, with impunity, illegally obtain a manuscript and publish its contents as long as one takes care to paraphrase less than the entire work and return the manuscript within
a short period of time. Harper & Row believed that the sanction of
such conduct will not only impair the ability to license the publication of excerpts in advance of a book's publication, but more importantly will lessen the incentive for authorship and adversely affect the dissemination of knowledge. Indeed, Harper & Row's
position was that this case illustrates this adverse impact. Since
Time cancelled its publication, the net result of The Nation's publication was that excerpts from the manuscript were disseminated
to the public not in Time magazine, but in The Nation, a magazine
that reaches a far smaller audience. It is ironic that this result occurred while a dissemination of knowledge argument prevailed.
Finally, Harper & Row claimed that the majority erred by not
55.

Harper & Row, 557 F. Supp. at 1072.

56. Id.
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considering that the manuscript was unpublished.57 Harper & Row
pointed to legislative history where Congress made clear its intent
that the distinction between published and unpublished works was
a factor in the fair use analysis. 8 They also argued that before the
Act became effective, unpublished works were protected by common law copyright. At common law, the author clearly had "the
exclusive right to the first publication of his work." 5 ' This is also
one of the author's exclusive rights as provided in section 106(3) of
the Act. e0
Harper & Row thus argued that legislative and case history
made clear Congress' intent that an author's right of first publication should be defeated only in extraordinary circumstances. A
user of material from an unpublished manuscript who invokes the
fair use doctrine should demonstrate that the public will derive
some benefit from the dissemination of the material in advance of
its dissemination by the author. Harper & Row claimed that The
Nation failed to do so. The mere fact that the material may have
been of interest to The Nation's readers did not provide such a
justification where the manuscript was soon to be published.
In support of finding a fair use, The Nation and the Second
Circuit rejected Harper & Row's and the lower court's analysis of
The Nation's fair use assertion. First, the Second Circuit chastised
the lower court for substituting its own views concerning the quality of journalism. Rather, the majority held that "the task of the
courts in fair use analysis, should be understood not as deciding
what makes bonafide news, but as examining whether a claim of
'news reporting' is false." 61
In considering the purpose and character of the use, The Nation argued that Harper & Row was mistaken when they claimed
that the use was not productive and thus presumptively not fair
because nothing original was added. Not only did three experts
testify at trial regarding the newsworthiness of the article62 but
The Nation relied on the recent decision in Sony Corp. of America
57. The four factors provided in section 107 are not inclusive.
58. See S. Rep. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. 64 (1975).
The applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works is narrowly limited
since, although the work is unavailable, this is the result of a deliberate choice on the part of
the copyright owner. Under ordinary circumstances, the copyright owner's right of first publication would outweigh any needs of reproduction for classroom purposes. Id.
59. Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith, 204 F. 398, 402 (8th Cir. 1913). See also Fendler
v. Moroso, 254 N.Y. 281, 171 N.E. 56 (1930).
60. See supra note 6.
61. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 207.
62. Id. at 206.
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v. Universal City Studios, Inc..1 At issue in Sony was whether
home videotaping was a productive use. The Supreme Court referred to the House and Senate Reports on section 107, which included the following example of fair use: "summary of an address
or article, with brief quotations, in a news report." The Nation
countered the Harper & Row argument by asserting that it would
impose on the court the onerous task of determining in each case
whether the use was productive or non-productive. In deciding
copyright cases, The Nation pointed out that courts have historically refrained from making these very determinations. In Blustein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,66 Justice Holmes, in eschewing
such subjective judgment when he refused to exclude circus posters
from copyrightable subject matter, stated that "it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
' 66
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.
Finally, The Nation rejected Harper & Row's assertion that
the court should have inquired into the comparative contribution
to the public benefit between The Nation's use and the use that
Time planned to make. Harper & Row claimed that The Nation,
with its smaller circulation, disserviced the public by publishing its
article before Time published its excerpts. On its face, this position
of greater benefit because of greater circulation is not only unjust
but is also filled with constitutional flaws. 7 Regarding the nature
of the copyrighted work, The Nation, through its fact-distinction
analysis, stated that since a great deal of the material in the Ford
memoirs is factual, historic and biographical, and since much of
the material had been previously printed in a government document, the scope of protection afforded the work should be narrow.
Applying the third factor, The Nation argued that the amount
of copyrighted material that may be used without ranging beyond
the bounderies of fair use varies widely from case to case. In Sony,
the Court held that verbatim copying of entire movies and television programs were within the boundries of fair use." In Henry
Holt & Co. ex rel Felderman v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., the
court held that the use of three sentences from a book in an adver63.
64.
65.

104 S. Ct. 777 (1984).
Id. at 807, n.29.
188 U.S. 239 (1903).

66. Id. at 251.
67.
(1968).
68.

See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Williams v. Rhodes, 394 U.S. 23
Sony, 104 S. Ct. 777 (1984).
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tising pamphlet was not fair use." The Nation argued that the
proper legal standard to be applied was whether the amount used
was appropriate to the purpose.7 0
Regarding the effect of the use upon the potential market
value of the copyrighted work, The Nation rejected Harper &
Row's argument that the pre-publication licensing of excerpts and
the subsequent dissemination of knowledge will be adversely affected. The Nation pointed out that newspapers have frequently
printed news articles about forthcoming books prior to their publication. 1 Furthermore, the Second Circuit held that the district
court erred in concluding that the fourth factor weighed against a
finding of fair use because Harper & Row's agreement with Time
was aborted. The court of appeals determined that by failing to
take into account that the article consisted of wholly uncopyrighted material in the public domain, the district court essentially granted copyright protection by fact where none existed by
law.
Disagreeing with Harper & Row's argument that the fact that
the manuscript was unpublished should have been taken into consideration, pursuant to section 106(3) of the Act, The Nation
pointed to section 107 which states: "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for
purposes such as ... news reporting . . ., is not an infringement
of copyright."' In other words section 106 is subject to section 107
of the Act. The Nation also argued that Congress, if it had intended to narrow or abandon fair use in unpublished works, would
have done so since it knew how to codify such a distinction. The
Nation pointed out that the Act expressly incorporates the distinction between unpublished and published works in several sec69. 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
70. See Italian Book Corp. v. American Broadcasting Co., 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). ABC's recording of a portion of the copyrighted song and its subsequent playing on
the television program constituted an integral part of a news report on an event of public
interest. See also 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 [A]12] at 13-35 (1984), stating that "in any given case, this question cannot be answered without a consideration of the
purpose for which the defendant's work will be used."
71. See The New York Times, March 27, 1976, at 9 col. I (news article about the
Woodward and Bernstein book, THE FINAL DAYS, relating to the resignation of President
Nixon); The New York Times, Sept. 23, 1976, at 36 col. 1 (news story about revelations
about President Ford in the yet unpublished memoirs of John Dean entitled BLIND AMBITION); The New York Times, Sept. 29, 1976, at 1 col. 2 (news story about forthcoming autobiography of President Nixon based on "164 pages of contemplated manuscript that was
closely guarded.").
72. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1977).
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tions. The Act did not do so with respect to fair use. Thus, The
Nation reasoned that Congress never intended such a distinction
to be made in the fair use analysis.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Copyright Act provides two mechanisms by which the
rights of a copyrightholder may be protected without impeding the
public's access to information. The first of these devices is the distinction between expression, which is copyrightable, and idea or
fact which is not. The second means of balancing an author's right
to his work and the public's need to be informed is the doctrine of
fair use. With Harper& Row presently before the Supreme Court,
it is now necessary for the Court to look at the two divergent opinions of what is copyrightable material and what constitutes fair use
in works of non-fiction.
Before determining whether an author's use of a prior author's
work is fair, it is first necessary to determine whether the material
appropriated was even copyrightable. The Nation's "dissection approach" appears to be a very rational and workable method. By
distilling the subsequent author's work to determine what material
was appropriated from the prior author, the court can then better
determine whether such appropriation was of copyrightable matter
via fact/expression analysis. Finally, if there was an appropriation
of copyrightable material, the court can then determine whether
such use of the prior author's work was fair within the confines
provided by the Act. This approach is much more manageable
than that of the district court's approach of commencing with a
fair use analysis based on the two works in their entirety.
Once having distilled the subsequent author's work, the court
must determine whether the appropriated material is protected by
copyright. In doing so, the court must decide whether it was the
prior author's expression which was appropriated or whether it was
facts or ideas that were used. Subsequently, the court must now
define what is expression. Is it merely the author's description of
the facts themselves or is it, as Harper & Row argued, the author's
marshalling of these facts? In deciding, the court should look to
the policy behind the Act balancing the author's rights in his work
and the public's need for the free communication of knowledge. In
this light, Harper & Row's totality argument would prevent the
dissemination of knowledge by granting an author copyright pro73.

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 104, 108, 302(c)(2) (1977).
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tection for facts merely because he arranged these facts in a particular order, although the facts are not per se copyrightable.
Finally, in deciding whether The Nation's use of Ford's copyrightable material was indeed a fair use, the Supreme Court must
determine whether the claim of news reporting is false and if not,
whether it was fair. Two of the four factors provided for by the
statute clearly in question are the purpose of the use and the effect of the use upon the potential market value of the copyrighted
work. The Nation argued that the purpose of the article was news
reporting-the reporting of information behind the pardon of a
President of the United States. The purpose behind using Ford's
copyrightable material was to give credence and credibility to the
article. Harper & Row and the lower court both recognized that
since much of the information in the memoirs on the Nixon pardon
was printed five years earlier in a government document, it was no
longer newsworthy. What Harper & Row overlooked was the fact
that the scant verbatim appropriation from the memoirs contained
never before mentioned information as to Ford's revelations during
this time. This material was never revealed before because of
Ford's agreement with Harper & Row "to avoid participating in
any 'public discussion' of the unique information not previously
disclosed. '74 Thus, the material appropriated from the memoirs
was indeed newsworthy and subject to fair use.
As to the effect of the use upon the potential market value of
the copyrighted work, it is clear that as a result of the article,
Harper & Row lost $12,500.00 from Time magazine's failure to
publish the excerpts. In their argument Harper & Row failed to
mention any adverse affects on the sale of Ford's book. What they
argued instead is the potential harm to publishers who contract
pre-publication excerpt agreements and the potential need to increase security.
Regarding the nature of the copyrighted work, it is apparent
that where the work is autobiographical and comprised of a great
deal of factual information, the scope of copyright is narrow indeed. Where the quantitative amount of copyrighted material
constituted 300 words in an article of over 2,250 words, the amount
appropriated is insubstantial."'
In determining whether appropriated material from a work of
non-fiction is copyrightable, it is necessary to see if the material in
74.
75.
76.

Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 197.
Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 974.
Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 208.
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question is fact or expression. In determining whether the use of a
prior author's work is fair, one must determine whether the use
meets the criterion established by the Act. Before coming to a conclusion one must decide whether a balance between the author's
rights in his work and the public's need to be informed has been
achieved.
Alfred Scope
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